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fice are likely to be only marginally more enthusiastic as they
might fear a similar fate. For example, German mandatory pen-
sion entitlements have been downscaled by a reduction scheme
stretching over two to three decades, but no one, including the
government that initiated these changes, sees this as sufficient
to solving the looming problem of underfunding the compul-
sory pay-as-you-go pension system.
Second, deep uncertainty, “a situation where the system mo-
del and the input parameters to the system model are not known
or widely agreed on by the stakeholders to the decision”, refers
to the breadth of parameter values which we may contemplate
(Lempert 2002). For example, there is considerable uncertainty
regarding the price of carbon offsets under various choices of
policy instruments, and we have little experience with accurate-
ly predicting the price of carbon offsets for a 50 percent emis-
sion reduction over the next half century.
Third, public goods aspects relate both to the generation of
long-term policy challenges as well as ways to respond to them.
Quite often, long-term policy challenges are generated by exter-
nalizing some cost to the public, both contemporaneously as well
as intertemporaneously. For example, if historical carbon emis-
sions already lead to uncompensated climate-related impacts
now, then some past decision-makers will have benefitted, kno-
wingly or unknowingly, from carbon releases at the expense of
present generations. In addition, curbing future emissions itself
is a public goods problem in a mostly decentralized world. Tho-
se countries serving as leaders may not witness immediate be-
nefits for themselves, and future benefits may be quite uncer-
tain, thereby making it profitable for only a small range of
countries to venture into global public goods productions – and
others to free-ride.
Overall, long-term policy challenges pose a rather difficult
class of challenges that are beyond the scope of single parlia-
ments, political and bureaucratic tenures in office, and yet have
eschewed comparative research.
Why Long-Term Policy Challenges Arise
Why do problems, such as underfunded pension plans, lack
of infrastructure to protect society from the effects of natural di-
sasters or climate change exist? In essence, there are at least two
major explanatory routes. First, the time consistency problem
may loom and not allow for consistent policy-making over time,
and second, even if multiple generations are included in deci-
sion-making, a coalition of older generations and segments of
younger generations may support intergenerational redistribu-
It appears we are surrounded by long-term policy problems. Pu-blic and private pension plans for the elderly are currently re-
designed so as to close the gap between implicit entitlements gi-
ven out in the past and the ability to actually honor those financial
obligations. The level of public debt sharply restricts the opportu-
nities for politicians to enjoy the fruits of pork barrel in countries
such as Germany, Japan, France or Italy. Public health care sys-
tems seem to be stretched in some industrialized countries; and
global climate change, if unabated, may lead to severe sea-level
rise and subsequently dislocate substantial parts of the earth’s po-
pulation living in proximity of the coastal areas.
These problems have in common that they are long-term po-
licy challenges. In subsequent sections, I briefly define this class
of problems, followed by alternative rationales why such chal-
lenges come about, and offer a select set of institutional respon-
se options. I conclude by way of an agenda for research and pu-
blic policy (1).
Defining Long-Term Policy Challenges
Long-term policy challenges shall be defined as public poli-
cy issues that last at least one human generation, exhibit deep
uncertainty exasperated by the depth of time, and engender pu-
blic goods aspects both at the stage of problem generation as
well as at the response stage.
First, a long-term problem exists only if the mechanism cre-
ating it leads to substantial adverse effects for at least a human
generation of 25 years or remedies take an equally substantial
amount of time. Political proposals by governments to underta-
ke interventions like substantial devaluation of pension entitle-
ments or substantial reductions in net debt by way of welfare
cuts are unattractive to most electorates in the short run and
thus are expected to lead to the removal of the government of
the day. Opposition parties with a chance of being voted into of-
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long-term policy challenges. Why do these 
problems come about and how can we limit
their impact? A four step agenda for research
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tion. In the following, I will briefly sketch both perspectives. In
their seminal work on time inconsistency, Kydland and Prescott
(1977) demonstrate that optimal choices at one point in time
may be at odds with optimal choices taken at future points in
time. Policies may be designed such that one policy rule is ad-
ministered in the first period, for example encouraging low in-
flation by way of wage restraint. However, at a later point in time,
it may be the best policy to actually permit some degree of in-
flation so as to reduce short-term unemployment. More gene-
rally, governments are tempted to renege on earlier promises.
“The suboptimality arises because there is no mechanism to in-
duce future policymakers to take into consideration the effect
of their policy, via the expectations mechanisms, upon current
decisions of agents” (Kydland / Prescott 1977).
For example, if it is not forbidden to build houses in flood
plains, people will build houses in such locations while antici-
pating that the government will ultimately build dams so as to
protect them or compensate them for flood damages incurred.
This example was actually mentioned by Kydland and Prescott
in their original 1977 publincation which contributed to the
award of the 2004 Nobel Prize in Economics (Kydland / Pres-
cott 1977). It would have been preferable to forbid erecting hou-
sing in such areas and stick to the announced rule. As a conse-
quence, no houses would have been built in risk-prone area; or
only by risk-taking investors. Governments would have been sa-
ved from paying compensation. The current global financial li-
quidity and risk assessment crisis shows strong similarities to
the flooding example on both sides of the Atlantic. As a result
of their findings, Kydland and Prescott advice to bind present
and future decision-makers, for example by having a fixed rule
that is enforced over time rather than having easy discretion for
change. The adherence to rules and its positive implications for
government credibility had substantial impact on the design of
institutions of monetary policy, especially the rule-based expan-
sion of monetary aggregates that many central banks adhere to
following the 1970s period of stagflation.
A second perspective on why intergenerational issues may
arise, originates from models of intergenerational redistribu-
tion. For example, Tabellini (1991) builds a simple two genera-
tion model where the parent generation lives for two periods
while the children generation only lives for one, that means they
overlap for one period when they also take common decisions.
While both generations receive initial endowments financed
through government bonds, the parental generation also recei-
ved unequal amounts of non-storable output and it can bequeath
parts of its wealth to its offsprings.
Institutional Response Options
Since the parental generation commands a first mover ad-
vantage, it can issue debts, but it faces the risk that future gene-
rations renege on repaying those bonds in the second period.
In his model, Tabellini (1991) demonstrates that a coalition of
parents and wealthy children supports the issuance of public
debt, although this has intergenerational redistributional effects.
The logic supporting the finding is that wealthy children do not
wish to endanger their bequests. For the findings to hold, the
debt originally issued must be large enough and sufficiently wi-
dely spread so that a coalition of parents and children supports
such a policy and does not renege on servicing the debts.
Both models alert us to the reasons why long-term policy
challenges may come about. Besides the suggestion by Kydland
and Prescott to use rules rather than discretion or Tabellini’s
conclusion that there are boundaries to which older generations
may impose a burden on future generations, there may be ad-
ditional institutional response options for policy-makers. I will
outline only a few of them below.
Merely calling for long-term problems to be overcome mis-
ses the problem, because they exist and persist. Thus, it is be-
neficial to know from which menu of options policymakers
could make selections. This brief exploration comprises merely
four options, including the
❚ sugar daddy solution,
❚ commitment to rule-based decisions,
❚ intergenerational accounting, and
❚ liability.
Sugar Daddy Solution
Perhaps the most straightforward solution is to buy out the
constituency that accounts for the problem. Following propo-
sals by the European Commission to compensate its sugar beet
industry in exchange for downsizing in the face of much lower
world market prices for sugar cane, I will coin this the sugar
daddy solution (Economist 2005). In this particular case, the ad-
justment is essentially financed by third parties, namely the tax-
payers of the European Union in return for lower consumer pri-
ces. In essence, an external financier who is capable to solve the
long-term policy challenge has to be found. Shifting the burden
of adjustment to third parties will certainly be attempted, such
as in pay-as-you-go pension systems, but it is unlikely that out-
siders will assume responsibility voluntarily. Instead, relevant
funds for financing the underfunded portions of pension plans,
covering public debt, or financing mitigation of and adaptation
to climate change will largely remain national obligations.
Airbus Solution
The second response option has been foreshadowed by Kyd-
land and Prescott (1977) when they proposed the creation of po-
litical institutions that follow rules over time and which are de-
tached from day-to-day political interference. The creation of
independent central banks which follow a pre-set path of mo-
netary expansion serves as a good example, as does the consis-
tent and hitherto successful funding of industrial projects, such
as Airbus.
In the case of central bank independence, members of the
relevant decision-making body are politically appointed, yet ex-
18
SCHWERPUNKT: LANGFRISTPOLITIK UND SOZIAL-ÖKOLOGISCHER WANDEL
ÖkologischesWirtschaften   2.2008
tremely hard to remove during their tenure. The principal go-
als of such autonomous bodies are normally enshrined in res-
pective laws which provide broad policy guidance, while speci-
fic decisions are taken by committee rule. As a consequence,
governments find themselves at times at loggerheads with their
autonomous central banks as the effects of fiscal and monetary
policy risk to cancel each other out.
A weaker version of rule-based decision-making can be wit-
nessed in the creation of Airbus as a competitor to Boeing in the
commercial aircraft business for carrying more than 100 pas-
sengers. In the early 1970s, Airbus did not yet deliver any air-
crafts. By now, it controls roughly 50 percent of the relevant mar-
ket. Airbus is the result of restructuring the European civilian
aircraft industry by the governments of Germany, the United
Kingdom, France and Spain who all saw that national industries
would not be viable in global competition. Thus, they suppor-
ted industry restructuring and provided so-called launch aid for
new aircraft models such as the A380. Under a 1992 agreement
with Boeing, up to 33 percent of the development costs of a new
plane are borne by taxpayers. If the product is a commercial fai-
lure, launch aid turns into an outright subsidy. In the case of
commercial success, however, the bonds are repaid with inte-
rest and royalty payments are due on total sales of this type of
aircraft, essentially making taxpayers a project-based part-ow-
ner of Airbus. This innovative financing of industry projects
could, for example, be applied to research and development for
a transition to renewable energy sources. Other applications in-
clude targeted tax relief for private pension plans so as to avoid
that retirees will unnecessarily draw on public welfare payments.
Intergenerational Accounting
One way to capture the obligations which present societies
impose on infinite future generations is the concept of inter-
temporal public liabilities. Originally developed by Auerbach,
Gokhale, and Kotlikoff, it has been applied in country-specific,
European-wide, as well as cross-national studies of the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Generational accounts “report for every generation alive the re-
maining net payments to the budget and distribute the resul-
ting burden, or surplus, equally on all future generations” (Raf-
felhüschen 2002). They include both explicit government
liabilities, such as those included in present law or commitment
to repay public debt, as well as implicit liabilities, for example
those caused by the second demographic transition to small fa-
milies in advanced industrial societies. The major calculus bu-
ilds on the infinite integral of discounted net tax revenues mi-
nus the present public debt. Taking the infinite integral involves
judgment about economic growth and reforms of public entit-
lements. The latter are normally assessed by expert judgment.
The resulting indicator of intertemporal public liabilities (IPL),
expressed as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product is used to
judge how sustainable public financial affairs are.
In an empirical study by Raffelhüschen (2002) of major
OECD countries, only Ireland, Norway, and Belgium enjoy rat-
her orderly public finances. Figure 1 illustrates also that Aus-
tria, Sweden, and Finland show the opposite pattern by having
net IPLs of up to 2.5 times their GDP (Raffelhüschen 2002).
While these results are dependent on the configuration of spe-
cific assumptions, they provide a coarse overview to which de-
gree public finances are managed more or less prudently. In ef-
fect, if public entities would be audited and certified like private
companies, such intertemporal public liabilities would have to
be added to the balance sheet of the public sector. While such
design does not assure a public response and does not preclu-
de myopic reasoning by politicians and voters alike, it certainly
is an accounting device that signals the exposure of the public
sector. More generally, inducing transparency regarding long-
term policy challenges, including associ-
ated uncertainties, would  constitute a
useful option.
Liability
Intertemporal public liability is an ac-
counting and information device, but it
could also form the foundation for inter-
generational liability. It is astonishing to
see the difference in liability which chief
executives of private firms have to face as
compared to holders of public office. Po-
liticians essentially face only the threat of
not being reelected, private sector Chief
Executive Officers (CEOs) have to fear
being sued for civil damages implying a
threat to their private wealth and being
subject to criminal law and imprison-
ment. For example, recklessly sending a
Figure 1: Composition of the intertemporal public liabilities in a Cross-Country Comparison (1995), 
Indexation of Transfers according to legal status quo
Source: Raffelhüschen 2002
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private company into bankruptcy normally constitutes grounds
for exploring personal liability of private sector CEOs. Politici-
ans rarely face such threats in advanced industrial societies for
adverse public management outcomes. This could lead politici-
ans to be more risk-taking than they would be in case of more
adequate rules of liability.
Liability for public decisions of an intergenerational nature
was, considered in a United States court case of environmental
non-governmental organizations against the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation and the Export-Import Bank in so far
as the decisions of both entities have climate impacts on cities
in the United States. More encouragingly, in the case of insu-
ring against the effects of earthquakes, the California Earthqua-
ke Authority has built a publicly backed private insurance sys-
tem that allows for homeowners to insure against damages that
are likely to occur over longer time intervals in earthquake-pro-
ne areas. To avoid undue moral hazard, policy holders must nor-
mally accept a 10 to 15 percent deductible.
In conclusion, I have considered four possible solutions to
design institutions to deal with long-term challenges. In parti-
cular, commitment to rule-based decisions, smart investment,
transparency by generational accounting, and liability could be
considered as general design options, to be augmented by a bro-
ader set of response options.
Four challenges
This contribution has explored a definition of long-term po-
licy challenges and reviewed a few mechanisms which demon-
strate while they exist and persist. Responding to these challen-
ges, some design options were discussed.
Research on comparative long-term policy challenges is a rat-
her novel idea, yet likely to attract both academic attention and
become relevant to public policy. Four challenges may lie ahe-
ad, and I invite readers to contribute to their resolution. First,
we should undertake comparable evaluations of the magnitude
of long-term policy issues. Second, we have to elaborate in more
detail why long-term policy challenges arise. Third, we have to
expand our menu of institutional response options. And final-
ly, we ought to probe which institutional response options are
politically feasible. Each of these steps is a major undertaking.
The special issue of the Journal Global Environmental Politics
on “Long-Term Policy Challenges”, scheduled for late 2009, is
merely a first step in this direction.
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